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THE FEDERAL CONSISTENCY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972:
IT'S TIME TO REPEAL THIS FUNDAMENTALLY
FLAWED LEGISLATION
Bruce Kuhse*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA)' was one of many
laws enacted during the "environmental decade 2 spanning the late 1960s
to the mid 1970s designed to bring a national focus on the protection and
management of natural resources. In the case of the CZMA, the entire
"coastal zone" of the United States, territories, and other island holdings
was deemed worthy of this national interest The CZMA was unlike the
other environmental laws in two major respects: it relied on the voluntary
program implementation by the coastal states, and it did not establish
mandatory standards for compliance.' Instead, the CZMA sought to
* J.D., with highest honors, Florida State University; M.S. Systems Management,
University of Southern California; Graduate, U.S. Naval Test Pilot School; B.S. Aerospace
Engineering, University of Southern California. Following a career as a U.S. Navy officer,
he is currently an attorney with Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A.,
Tallahassee, Florida, with the practice areas of aviation law, civil litigation, and environmen-
tal and land use law. Author of "Products Liability Law in Aviation Mishaps: Florida's
1999 Tort Reform Legislation and the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994,"
published in the Florida Bar Journal, Vol. 74, No. 7, (July-Aug. 2000).
1. Pub. L No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464
(West 1985 & Supp. 1999)) [hereinafter CZMA].
2. See DANuEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LmGA'noN, Preface (2d ed. 1992,
release 7, Aug. 1999).
3. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1453.
4. See Scott C. Whitney, et al, State Implementation of the Coastal Zone Management
Consistency Provisions-Ultra Vires or Unconstitutional? 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67
(1988).
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"encourage" state participation through federal financial grants and the
creation of a new "federal consistency" doctrine.5
The federal consistency doctrine generally requires federal agencies,
applicants for federal permits, and applicants for federal project funds to be
consistent with approved state management programs for activities
affecting the coastal zone.6 Thus, a state may stall, or even stop, a federal
agency activity far removed from the boundaries of the state by objecting
that the activity is not consistent with the state's management program and
that the activity affects the state's coastal zone. Although there are
provisions for administrative appeal to the Secretary of Commerce to assert
some exceptions to the consistency requirement,7 the doctrine serves as an
inverse preemption of federal authority and an unnecessary burden on
federal agencies and applicants.
This Article will discuss the provisions of the CZMA that focus on this
fundamentally flawed consistency doctrine, the court decisions that have
shaped the development of the doctrine, and the key 1990 amendments to
the CZMA enacted in response to the court decisions. This will be
followed by a discussion of the application of the consistency requirements,
with cases and consistency appeals examples that illustrate the unnecessary,
unfair, and costly administrative burden imposed on federal agencies and
permit applicants. CZMA's federal consistency doctrine will be examined
in light of Constitutional Federalism and Supremacy doctrines, plus other
federal environmental laws with mandatory regulatory standards, that
render the doctrine not only obnoxious, but also superfluous. Finally, this
article will note the Clinton administration's proposals for CZMA
amendments and the controversy concerning the 1999 reauthorization bill
that was introduced but not passed by Congress.
II. THE CZMA AND FEDERAL CONSISTENCY
A. The Background and Enactment of the CZMA
The CZMA has been termed a "bold experiment in natural resource
management and intergovernmental relations" designed with broad (and
conflicting) national objectives and policies, setting a framework for
5. See Jack Archer & Joan Bondareff, Implementation of the Federal Consistency
Doctrine-Lawful and Constitutional: A Response to Whitney, Johnson & Perles, 12 HARV.
ENvTL L. REv. 115, 117-118 (1988).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(I)(A) (1994).
7. See id. §§ 1456(c)(3)(B), 1456(h).
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"flexible, voluntary state responses" and a "state-federal partnership."' The
original legislation grew out of the environmental activism of the 1960's
and was spurred by the 1969 Stratton Commission report, Our Nation and
the Sea, which is claimed to have first used the term "coastal zone" to
identify the coastal areas as a unique environmental and resources
management issue.9 A parallel legislation proposal (initially supported by
President Nixon's administration) to create a comprehensive national land
use policy act failed because of the sheer volume of alternative proposals
and lack of consensus.1" After three years of contentious hearings and
power struggles in Congress, the CZMA was passed by Congress on
October 12, 1972," and signed into law by President Nixon on October 27,
1972, just days prior to his landslide reelection. 2
The Senate Commerce Committee stated that the main purpose of the
legislation was:
[T]he encouragement and assistance of States in preparing and
implementing management programs to preserve, protect, develop,
and whenever possible restore the resources of the coastal zone of
the United States .... There is no attempt to diminish state
authority through federal preemption. The intent of this legislation
is to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting the states
to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal
zones.
13
The Committee provided a litany of reasons from various reports to justify
the legislation: "The problems of the coastal zone are characterized by
burgeoning populations congregating in ever larger urban systems, creating
growing demands for commercial, residential, recreational, and other
development, often at the expense of natural values that include some of the
most productive areas found anywhere on earth."' 4 'The coast of the
United States is, in many respects, the Nation's most valuable geographic
feature."' 5  'The coastal zone presents one of the most perplexing
8. See DavidW. Owens, National Goals, State Flexibility, andAccountability in Coastal
Zone Management, 20 COASTAL MGMT. 143 (1992).
9. See David R. Godschalk, Implementing Coastal Zone Management: 1972-1990,20
COASTALMGMT. 93, 97 (1992).
10. See id. at 98-99.
11. See Legislative History, Pub. L. 92-583, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776.
12. See Godschalk, supra note 9, at 99.
13. S. REP. No. 92-753, at 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776.
14 Id. at 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4777.
15. ld. at 4778.
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environmental management challenges. The thirty-one States which border
on the oceans and the Great Lakes contain seventy-five percent of our
Nation's population. The pressures of population and economic develop-
ment threaten to overwhelm the balanced and best use of the invaluable and
irreplaceable coastal resources in natural, economic and aesthetic terms. ' 6
"The ultimate success of a coastal management program will depend on the
effective cooperation of federal, state, regional, and local agencies. "17
"[M]any of the biological organisms in the coastal zone are in extreme
danger."'"
The geographic diversity of some 94,000 miles of coastline, and
cultural and economic diversity of the nation, made developing a compre-
hensive, centralized coastal management program difficult.'9 One
commentator has called a uniform national approach impractical, stating:
"Effective coastal management requires both complex policy decisions and
a sensitivity to local needs and opportunities that cannot easily be obtained
in Washington."'2 The Senate Commerce Committee also recognized the
diversity of the socio-economic and political divisions involved in coastal
management:
The coastal zone also represents a sharp contrast with general land
utilization when viewed from a social aspect.... the coastal zone
is a politically complex area, involving local, state, regional,
national and international political interests .... Until recently,
local government has exercised most of the States' power to
regulate land and water uses. But in the last few years a transition
has been taking place, particularly as the States and the people
have more clearly recognized the need for better management of
the coastal zone.... It is the intent of the Committee to recognize
the need for expanding state participation in the control of land and
water use decisions in the coastal zone.... The Committee has
adopted the State as the focal point for developing comprehensive
plans and implementing management programs for the coastal
zone.
21
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4779.
19. See Owens, supra note 8, at 144-145.
20. Id. at 145.
21. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776,4779-80.
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The coastal states strongly supported the focus of coastal management at
the state level instead of the federal level.22 Others, such as environmental
advocates, were less happy with the state focus, preferring "a stronger
federal role to enforce substantive environmental performance standards
and to require state participation under centralized coastal planning and
management authority."z One author quoted a critic that "described the act
as 'poorly drafted, deficient in substantive standards, vague on policy, and
uncertain regarding agency responsibility' and characterized the start as
'shaky and uncertain. ' ''" Later court decisions, strong state political
pressure for environmental action, and the President Reagan era of reduced
federal support for environmental issues, would shift the environmentalist's
camps into states' management supporters also.
B. The CZMA of 1972
The CZMA included eight Congressional findings that mirrored the
concerns of the Senate Committee report, including the built-in conflict in
stating the national interest as "effective management, beneficial use,
protection, and development of the coastal zone."'  The findings also
stated that "present state and local institutional arrangements for planning
and regulating land and water use in such areas are inadequate" '26 and
concluded with the necessity of encouragement, assistance, and coopera-
tion:
The key to more effective protection and use of the land and water
resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise
their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone by
assisting the states, in cooperation with federal and local govern-
ments and other vitally affected interests, in developing land and
water use programs for the coastal zone, including unified policies,
criteria, standards, methods, and processes for dealing with land
and water use decisions of more than local significance.27
Section 303 of the Act next declared the national policy:
22. See Godschalk, supra note 9, at 99.
23. Id. at 100.
24. Id (quoting Z.L Zile, A Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972,3 COAMTALZONE MGMT.J. 235 (1974)).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
26. Id § 302(h).
27. Id § 302(i).
20011
82 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:77
(a) to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or
enhance, the resources...
(b) to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their
responsibilities...
(c) for all Federal agencies engaged in programs affecting the
coastal zone to cooperate and participate with state and local
governments and regional agencies in effectuating the purposes of
this title, and
(d) to encourage the participation of the public, of Federal, state,
and local governments... in the development of coastal zone
management programs.2"
Thus the values and concerns of the CZMA were so broadly drawn as to
include a consensus of the multitude of "stakeholders" with varied and
conflicting interests in the coastal zone.29
The vagueness of the CZMA was continued in the definition section,
defining "coastal zone" to be "the coastal waters (including the lands
therein and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands (including the waters
therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other and in proximity
to the shorelines of the several coastal states."30 The coastal zone was
bounded seaward by the outer limit of the territorial sea but the inland
boundary was not so definite. The inland boundary was set as "inland from
the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses
of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters."31
Specifically excluded were "lands the use of which is by law subject solely
to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government."3
The details of the coastal zone boundaries were left to the individual
coastal states in the development of their management programs.33 This has
allowed states to gain approval for their programs that have extreme
variations of inland area boundaries.34 California set a general inland
boundary of 1,000 yards from the shoreline, while Alaska used the inland
mark where the elevation of the land reached 1,000 feet. Connecticut used
the political boundaries of thirty-six coastal towns plus 1,000 feet inland or
the 100-year flood plain boundary, whichever is greater. Florida and
28. Id. § 1452.
29. See Godschalk, supra note 9, at 96.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 1454(b).
34. See William E. Guy, Jr., Florida's Coastal Management Program: A Critical
Analysis, I 1 COASTALZONE MGMT. J. 219, 223 (1983).
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Hawaii take the extreme approach and include the entire state in the coastal
zone. Florida's program has a split-level management plan, however,
including only the coastal counties for federal funding and federal
consistency review purposes.35
The CZMA initially authorized $9,000,000 for temporary annual
federal funding assistance to the states in the form of management program
development grants36 and, after program approval by the Secretary of
Commerce, authorized $30,000,000 for annual administrative grants.37
Program approval required a finding by the Secretary that the program was
developed and adopted: (1) per Federal rules and regulations;38 (2) after
notice; (3) "with the opportunity of full participation by relevant Federal
agencies, state agencies, local governments, regional organizations, port
authorities, and other interested parties, public and private;" (4) was
"adequate to carry out the purposes of [the CZMA];" and, (5) was
"consistent with" the declared policies of the CZMA.39 Programs were also
required to include definitions of permissible uses that have "direct and
significant impact on the coastal waters,'" "broad guidelines on priority of
uses,"4' "adequate consideration of the national interest involved in the
siting of facilities necessary to meet requirements which are other than
local in nature," 2 and assurances that local regulations "do not unreason-
ably restrict or exclude land or water uses of regional benefit."' 3 At the
Federal level, overall CZMA administration was assigned to the Office of
Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (ORCM) within the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).'
Providing financial incentives to states to develop or administer
programs is not new or unique to the CZMA. Indeed, it is a classic method
for Congress to exert influence on states without either running afoul of
Constitutional restraints for federal-state separation of powers, or needing
to become too creative by invoking workarounds, such as inventing
Commerce Clause rationalizations. 5 However, the CZMA went beyond
35. See id
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454(a), 1464(a)(1).
37. See id. §§ 1455, 1464(a)(2).
38. CZMA Section 314 authorized the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate rules and
regulations as necessary. Id § 1463.
39. Id § 1455(d)(1).
40. Id. § 1455(d)(2)(B).
41. Id. § 1455(d)(2)(E).
42. Id. § 1455(d)(8).
43. Id. § 1455(12).
44. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.40(c), 923,2(c) (2000).
45. See Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home On the Range? Equal Footing, The New
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financial incentives and brought forth the new, and flawed, requirement of
the "federal consistency" doctrine.
C. The Federal Consistency Requirement of the 1972 CZMA
Section 307 of the CZMVA was envisioned as the heart of the act,
providing the principal incentive for states to develop coastal management
programs.' The section charged the Secretary with the responsibility to
consult, cooperate, and coordinate with other Federal agencies,47 plus
forbid the Secretary to approve any state program "unless the views of
Federal agencies principally affected by such program have been ade-
quately considered."4 Federal agency development projects and activities
directly affecting the coastal zone were required to be conducted, "to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management
programs."4 9 Applicants for Federal licenses or permits for activities
"affecting any land or water use" in the coastal zone were required to
certify to the permitting agency that the applicant complied with, and was
consistent with, the state program." Similarly, state and local government
projects seeking Federal assistance from any other Federal programs were
required to be consistent with the state's plan.5'
Some dispute mechanisms were included in the CZMA. The Secretary
was authorized to mediate "serious disagreement between any Federal
agency and the state in the development of the [state] program."52 States
could contest the consistency certification by permit applicants, halting the
agency issuance of the permit. The Secretary was then authorized to hear
Federalism and State Jurisdiction On Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REv. 557, 615-16 (1995)
(discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), "the Court pointed to ways
Congress could 'urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal
interests."' The government could use the spending power to influence the States,
'attach[ing] conditions on the receipt of federal funds.' Alternatively, the Court recognized
that the government could give the States a choice between regulating activity in accordance
with federal standards, or facing preemption by federal regulation." Id. at 616 (citations
omitted).).
46. See Richard M. Lattimer Jr., Myopic Federalism: The Public Trust Doctrine and
Regulation ofMilitaryActivities, 150 MIL L. REv. 79, 123 (1995). See also JOSEPH J. KALO
ET AL, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 222 (1999).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a).
48. Id. § 1456(b).
49. Id. §§ 1456(c)(1)(A),(c)(2).
50. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
51 See id. § 1456(d).
52. Pub. L. No. 92-583 § 307(b), 86 Stat. 1280(1972). Later amendments also
authorized mediation for disagreements over the administration of state programs. See 16
U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1994).
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appeals to the objection, and override the state's objection only if finding
"that the activity is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is
otherwise necessary in the interest of national security.' 53 The Secretary
was not authorized to decide the issue of whether the state's consistency
determination was proper, but only whether or not to override the state's
objection.
No specific dispute resolution was included for a state's objections to
a Federal agency's activity or project. The legislative history on this issue
indicates that the Senate Commerce Committee believed the Secretary
would also resolve objections to Federal agency activities.' The Commit-
tee noted:
The Committee does not intend to exempt Federal agencies
automatically from the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch as Federal
agencies are given a full opportunity to participate in the planning
process, the Committee deems it essential that Federal agencies
administer their programs, including developmental projects,
consistent with the States' coastal zone management program. If
not, the ordinary course for a State would be to file a complaint
with the Secretary... he shall make his own findings as to the
consistency of the Federal developmental project with the State's
management program.55
This approach differed from the Secretary's role in permit applications in
that it would require a decision not just as to whether to override the
objection, but also to determine the correctness of the state's inconsistency
determination. It was not until the 1990 amendments to the CZMA were
enacted that a specific dispute resolution process for federal agency actions
was identified, elevating the override authority to the President.56
The House Conference report left the burden on the Federal agencies
to make the consistency determinations and adopted the language of
Section 307(e) to "make certain that there is no intent in this legislation to
change Federal or state jurisdiction or rights."'  The key elements of
Section 307 were twofold. First, it stated that: "Nothing in [the CZMA]
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3).
54. See S. REP. No. 92-753 (April 19, 1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776,
4793.
55. Id. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N, 4776,4793.
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (1994). For further discussion of the 1990 CZMA
amendments, see infra Part 11 (E).
57. S. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1544 (Oct. 5, 1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4822,
4824.
2001]
86 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:77
shall be construed--(1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction,
responsibility, or rights... (2) as superseding, modifying, or repealing
existing laws applicable to the various Federal agencies.""8 Second, it also
stated:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [the CZMA], nothing in
[the CZMA] shall in any way affect any requirement (1) estab-
lished by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, or
the Clean Air Act, as amended, or (2) established by the Federal
Government or by any state or local government pursuant to such
Acts. Such requirements shall be incorporated in any program
developed pursuant to [the CZMA]. 9
D. Evolution of the CZMA and the Consistency Doctrine
Implementation of the CZMA did not get off to a quick start. No funds
were appropriated for the first fourteen months of the program.' The
"Energy Crisis of 1973" intervened, causing an increased interest in
offshore oil exploration and development, and leading to the CZMA
Amendments of 1976 to deal with the offshore drilling concerns.6' The
first state management program was not approved until 1976 (Washington
State), which occurred before the program regulations were published in
1977-78.62
The confusion over the implementation was readily apparent in one of
the early court challenges to the approval of a state's program. In American
Petroleum Institute v. Knecht,63 the Institute, an oil and gas association and
corporate members sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the
Secretary from approving California's proposed Coastal Zone Management
Program (CZMP).6 They argued that the CZMP failed to meet the content
requirements of the CZMLA, that it had not been properly adopted by the
state, and that the required environmental impact statement had also been
improperly developed and adopted.65 The court rejected the contentions
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1).
59 Id. § 1456(b) (emphasis added).
60. See Godschalk, supra note 9, at 101.
61. See id. at 101-102.
62. See id. at 103.
63. 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affd. 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979).
64. See id. at 893.
65. See id.
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and affirmed the CZMP approval,66 but expressed its clear disdain for the
CZMA processes:
The Court has before it for determination both preliminarily and
for ultimate disposition questions of the highest importance,
greatest complexity, and highest urgency. They arise as the result
of high legislative purpose, low bureaucratic bungling, and present
inherent difficulty in judicial determination. In other words, for
the high purpose of improving and maintaining felicitous condi-
tions in the coastal areas of the United States, the Congress has
undertaken a legislative solution, the application of which is so
complex as to make it almost wholly unmanageable. In the course
of the legislative process, there obviously came into conflict many
competing interests which, in typical fashion, the Congress sought
to accommodate, only to create thereby a morass of problems
between the private sector, the public sector, the federal bureau-
cracy, the state legislature, the state bureaucracy, and all of the
administrative agencies appurtenant thereto. Because the action
taken gives rise to claims public and private which must be
adjudicated, this matter is now involved in the judicial process.67
The court examined and accepted standing for the plaintiffs68 and
ripeness of the issue for judicial review.69 However, the court declined to
accept the contention that the standard of review should be de novo, instead
conceding "considerable deference" to agency interpretation of the new law
and regulations and applying the highly deferential "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard for review of the agency's actions and decisions." The
legislative history of the CZMA was examined in depth, as was the
development of California's CZMP and the approval process; the court
concluded that specificity of substantive requirements was not required by
the CZMA and the balancing-of-interests decisions were not irrational.7
The decision ended with the court speaking frankly about the "befuddle-
ment" of the CZMA:
The message is as clear as it is repugnant: under our so-called
federal system, the Congress is constitutionally empowered to
66. See id at 894.
67. kL at 895-96.
68. See id. at 897.
69. See id. at 903.
70. See id. at 903, 907-908.
71. See U at 912-31.
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launch programs the scope, impact, consequences and workability
of which are largely unknown, at least to the Congress, at the time
of enactment; the federal bureaucracy is legally permitted to
execute the congressional mandate with a high degree of befuddle-
ment as long as it acts no more befuddled than the Congress must
reasonably have anticipated; if ultimate execution of the congres-
sional mandate requires interaction between federal and state
bureaucracy, the resultant maze is one of the prices required under
the system.72
The proponents of a strong CZMA program looking to rein in coastal
development encountered more obstacles in the 1980's. The Executive
branch, under the leadership of President Reagan, saw the federal support
of individual state programs as unnecessary.73 The Administration sought
to eliminate Federal funding for the states' CZMA grants, believing that the
state programs had matured and were successful.74 Another explanation
was that the Administration saw the misuse of the CZMA by the states and
environmental groups as political opposition to Administration decisions
to pursue greater national energy independence through offshore gas and
oil development.75 Florida, California, and Alaska were active in claiming
inconsistency to oppose outer continental shelf (OCS) projects.76 Others
viewed the program as merely having the "bad fortune to enter its
implementation period under the cloud of a hostile administration bent on
deregulation of private enterprise in every area of public policy and of a
president who had previously opposed coastal management as the governor
of California."77 Congress, however, continued to support the CZMA.78
The second obstacle was the Supreme Court decision in 1984,
Secretary of the Interior v. California,79 that was seen as severely limiting
the consistency requirements of the CZMA.80 In that case, the Court
evaluated California's claim that a decision by the Department of the
72. Id. at 931.
73. See Jack H. Archer & Robert W. Knecht, The U.S. National Coastal Zone
Management Program-Problems and Opportunities in the Next Phase, 15 COASTALMGMT.
103, 104 (1987).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 108.
76. See id.
77. Godschalk, supra note 9, at 104.
78. See id. at 105.
79. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
80. See Jack H. Archer, Evolution of Major 1990 CZMA Amendments: Restoring
Federal Consistency and Protecting Coastal Water Quality, 1 TERR.SEAJ. 191,193 (1991).
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Interior (DOI), to conduct the sale of oil and gas leases of submerged lands
of the outer continental shelf, was an activity directly affecting the coastal
zone, and thus a CZMA consistency determination should be required."
California's specific concern was that one of the lease tracts was within
twelve miles from a sea otter breeding area and that an oil spill would be
harmful.8 2 It argued that the lease sale had a "direct affect" because it
started a chain of events that could end in full-blown development and
production. 3 DOI countered that the lease sale did not trigger the CZMA
Section 307(c)(1) consistency determination requirements because the lease
sale had no direct, identifiable impact." Interestingly, both sides agreed
that the preliminary exploration that would be authorized by the leases
would have no significant effect on the zone. 5
The Court found the plain language of the CZMA ambiguous and
proceeded to search the legislative history of the act for answers.8 6 It
concluded that Congress did not intend to extend the Section's consistency
compliance to federal agency activities outside the territorial waters, but
instead that: "Section 307(c)(1)'s 'directly affecting' language was aimed
at activities conducted or supported by federal agencies on federal lands
physically situated in the coastal zone but excluded from the zone as
formally defined by the Act."87 The Court continued its analysis and noted
that Section 307(c)(1) was the incorrect section to apply anyway because
the agency was not the "principal actor" of the activity, the agency was not
conducting or supporting the oil or gas drilling of concern, only selling
leases for others to do so.88 Section 307(c)(3), which required consistency
for licenses or permits affecting the coastal zone, was termed "the more
pertinent provision."89
Again, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the CZMA and its
amendments, this time finding that the OCS lease sales, identified as the
second stage of an administrative process established by a 1978 amendment
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), were rejected by
Congress for inclusion in Section 307(c)(3).' The Court noted however,
that "states with approved CZMA plans retain considerable authority to
81. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 317 (1984).
82. See i at318.
83. See id. at 321.
84. See id.
85. See id
86. See id.
87. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 332.
89. Ma. at 333.
90. See id. at 334-336.
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veto inconsistent exploration or development and production plans put
forward in those latter stages."9' The four dissenting justices argued that
the plain meaning of the "directly affecting" language was to enlarge the
scope of federal activities subject to the consistency requirements of
Section 307(c)(1). 9' The dissent's reading of legislative histories lead them
to conclude that Congress intended OCS lease sales to have the federal
consistency doctrine applied.93 In 1990, Congress reauthorized and
amended the CZMA to overturn the decision.94
E. Consistency and the 1990 CZMA Amendments
The Court's narrow interpretation of the consistency requirement
outraged environmentalists and prompted calls for immediate action by
Congress. 95 Numerous bills were introduced in Congress during the 1980's,
but for a variety of reasons, they all failed to pass.' 1990 saw a "well-
organized coalition" of environmentalists, coastal states, academics, and
Congressional members and staff, finally push through a reauthorization of
the CZMA and its amendments.97 The effort was aided by the legislative
strategy of bundling the legislation into the bulky Omnibus Reconciliation
Act to ensure passage and signature by President Bush.98 The inclusion of
the CZMA did not even gather a mention in the President's signing state-
ment in which he outlined the important aspects of the Omnibus Act.99
Section 307(c)(1) was amended, with two subparts added, to 'restore
the consistency authority" of the CZMA.'0 It now states:
91. Id. at 341.
92. See id. at 346, 355.
93. See id. at 375, 376.
94. SeeH.R. REP. NO. 101-964 at § 6208(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374,
2675.
95. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Coastal Zone Management and the Searchfor Integration,
40 DEPAUL L. REv. 981, 994 (1991) (citation omitted).
96. See Archer, supra note 80 at 195. (For a listing of these bills, see Archer and
Bondareff, The Role of Congress in Establishing U.S. Sovereignty Over the Territorial Sea,
I TERR. SEAJ. 117,140, n.120 (1990).
97. See Archer supra note 80; Joan M. Bondareff, Congress, Reform, and Oceans
Policy, 22 COASTAL MGMT. 147, 154 (1994).
98. See Bondareff, supra note 97, at 154.
99. See Presidential Signing Statement, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (Nov. 5, 1990), 26
WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. DoC. 1764 (Nov. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2930-1--
2930-3.
100. See Archer, supra note 80, at 204.
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Each Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that
affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone
shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maxi-
mum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved
State management programs. A Federal agency activity shall be
subject to this paragraph unless it is subject to paragraph (2) or(3). 101
Subpart B limited exemptions to inconsistency determinations, requiring a
final Federal court judgment, certification by the Secretary of Commerce
that mediation is not likely to achieve compliance, and a written request by
the Secretary, before the President may grant an exemption for an activity
that is in the paramount interest of the United States. 2 Subpart C required
the agency to provide the consistency determination to the appropriate state
agency no later than ninety days prior to the final Federal activity
approval. 10 3
The House Conference Report explained that the changes were to
overturn the Supreme Court decision and "make clear that outer Continen-
tal Shelf oil and gas lease sales are subject to the requirements of section
307(c)(1). ' '"" 4 The Report continued: "The amended provision establishes
... any federal agency activity (regardless of location) is subject to the
CZMA requirement for consistency if it will affect.., the coastal zone. No
federal agency activities are categorically exempt." 105 The federal agency's
consistency determination is to include any effects that it "may reasonably
anticipate.., including cumulative and secondary effects."
The addition of the term "enforceable policies" to each of the
consistency subsections and CZMA definitions was described as codifying
the existing regulatory practice as set out in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 7 Enforcable policies are now defined within the CZMA itself as
"State policies which are legally binding through constitutional provisions,
laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative
decisions, by which a state exerts control over private and public land and
water uses and natural resources in the coastal zone."' 8 Thus, even the
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
103. See id. § 1456(c)(1)(C).
104. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, § 6208 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2017,2675.
105. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017,2675 (emphasis in original).
106. 1l
107. See id. at 2674, 2677.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(6a) (1994).
20011
92 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:77
smallest of state and local government units and agencies may impose
burdensome restrictions on federal government activities if the state's
coastal management program provides for the incorporation of such local
input.
While the Secretary is required not to approve state programs unless
the national interests and views of Federal agencies are considered, states
may submit changes to modify their existing approved programs at any
time, subject to conditions including the Secretary's approval."0 The
Secretary has only a 30-120 day window to review the submission for
approval or disapproval, or else the submission is "conclusively presumed
as approved.'.' Only a four-week window for review exists, before
presumed concurrence, when the state identifies the submission as a
"routine change."' 2 Thus a state with "networking"'" 3 of state, county,
city, and special district "enforceable policies" may overwhelm the
designated reviewing authority (the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management (OCRM)), and receive approval with only a cursory review. " 4
Florida has a typical "networked" coastal zone management program,
incorporating at the state level alone twenty-three chapters of Florida
Statutes, administered by eleven state agencies, and coordinated by the
Department of Community Affairs." 5 The program was initially approved
in 1981 and is nestled within the general context of overall growth
management programs. "6 The legislative intent, as expressed in the Florida
Coastal Management Act (FCMA)," 7 contains the conflicting sentiment "to
protect, maintain, and develop these [coastal] resources,"".. which mirrors
the conflict of the CZMA goals. The focus is generally on land use issues,
specifically local government's role in growth management." 9 Local
109. See id. §§ 1456(b), 1455(d).
110. See id. § 1455(e).
111. Id. § 1455(e)(2).
112. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.84(b)(3) (2000).
113. See id. § 923.43(b)(2).
114. See Owens, supra note 8, at 163 n.18.
115. See Fla. Dep't of Comm'y Aff., Federal Consistency: Intergovernmental
Coordination and Review (last modified Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.dca.state.fl.us/ffcm/>.
116. See Donna R. Christie & Paul Johnson, State Ocean Policy Initiatives in Florida,
18 COASTAL MGMT. 283, 284 (1990).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.20-380.24 (West 2000).
118. Id. § 380.21(1)(b).
119. See id. § 380.21 (l)(c); Christie & Johnson, supra note 116, at 284. Other included
chapters in the program with direct application to the coastal zone include: Ch. 161, Beach
and Shore Preservation; Ch. 186, State and Regional Planning; Ch. 380, Land and Water
Management (Part I, Environmental Land and Water Management, with statutes governing
development issues in areas of critical state concern (such as the Florida Keys) and
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governments are required to develop comprehensive plans that must be
"consistent" with regional plans and the state's plan." ° Local government
land use decisions must then be "consistent" with their comprehensive
plans."' Coastal governments are required to include a coastal manage-
ment "element" in their plans to identify the policies and program
implementation for, among other things, "quality of the coastal zone
environment, [and] orderly and balanced utilization and preservation [of]
resources."" Thus, Florida's program requires local government to
perform a balancing of conflicting policy goals similar to those of the
CZMA. The startling disparity is that the local government is not tasked by
Florida's growth management laws with consideration of national interests
in their plans and decisions, nor to coordinate with federal agencies for
input, even though local plans and decisions will be factors in CZMA
consistency determinations as "enforceable policies of an approved
program-"
Supporters have hailed the 1990 CZMA amendments as a success for
broadening the scope of consistency requirements and strengthening the
powers of the coastal states." They contend that federal agencies will be
more restrained in their activities and take the consistency obligations more
seriously than before."u Some supporters have focused on the availability
of the "states veto power" to implement environmental programs and slow
(or halt) development."z What seems to be missing is any concern for the
other national interests identified in the CZMA (beneficial use and
Developments of Regional Impact. Part II is Coastal Planning and Management which
contains the FCMA.); and Ch. 376, Pollutant Discharge, Prevention and Removal. Federal
consistency review by the state is authorized in Section 380.23, Florida Statutes.
120. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3167( West 2000). The primary growth management
statutory authority is the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Develop-
ment Regulation Act found in Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Interestingly, Florida's
State Comprehensive Plan describes itself as along-range policy guidance, direction-setting
document that "does not create regulatory authority or authorize the adoption of agency
rules, criteria, or standards not otherwise authorized by law." Id. § 187.101.
121. See id. § 163.3194.
122. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g). Florida's coastal zone management program has been
criticized for its lack of attention to ocean resource management. See Christie & Johnson,
supra note 116, at 283. For additional information on Florida's growth management and
coastal regulation see: Richard Grosso, Florida's Growth Management Act: How Far We
Have Come, and How Far We Have Yet To Go, 20 NOVA L. REv. 589 (1996); Donna R.
Christie, Growth Management In Florida: Focus On The Coast, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTI.
L 33 (1987); Kenneth E. Spahn, The Beach and Shore Preservation Act: Regulating
Coastal Construction In Florida, 24 STETSON L. REv. 353 (1995).
123. See Archer, supra note 80, at 221.
124. See id
125. See Rychlak, supra note 95, at 987, 992.
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development).1 6 Similarly notable is that the envisioned federal-state
partnership and cooperation has been turned into federal government
capitulation, without any satisfactory explanation as to why a balancing of
national interests is best accomplished by local and state government
agencies, instead of those federal institutions with Constitutionally derived
powers.
IH. CONSISTENCY IN OPERATION
A. Federal Activities
The regulations implementing the CZMA state: 'The coordination
requirements ... are intended to achieve a proper balancing of diverse
interests in the coastal zone. The policies of [the CZMA] require that there
be a balancing of variety, sometimes conflicting, interests." '' Federal acti-
vities are required to be "consistent to the maximum extent practicable"
which is defined as fully consistent unless otherwise restricted by law.'?,
Thus, federal agencies have no discretion to vary from the state programs
as might be expected from the statutory term "practicable," which implies
a reasoned decision process and not absolute compliance. Mediation or
judicial review may be sought if the state disagrees with the consistency
determination of the federal agency.'29 Only the President of the United
States may exempt a Federal activity found inconsistent by a Federal court
after a state's objection, and then only if finding that the activity meets the
lofty standard of being "in the paramount interest of the United States. ' ' 30
One author described the process and made the observation that: "The
onerous nature and political visibility of the exemption procedures make it
unlikely that any federal agency will make use of the provision." ' 1
The CZMA has been used to challenge a variety of Federal agency
activities, ranging from the establishment of an international refugee camp
on a military installation,' 32 the construction of new strategic homeport
facilities for a Navy aircraft carrier battle group,'3 3 transfer of lands to the
126. See 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994).
127. 15 C.F.R. § 923.50(a) (2000).
128. See id. § 930.32.
129. See 15 C.F.R. 930.43, 930.116 (2001).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (1994).
131. Lattimer, supra note 46, at 124.
132. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035,1061 (D.P.R.
1981), vacated as moot by Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981).
133. See Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Federal government,"M and the government's sale of a river-front residence
that was obtained in a drug forfeiture proceeding. 35 These actions are
indicative of the states' intrusion into matters of purely Federal responsibil-
ity that is encouraged and permitted by the CZMA. Two of the cases will
be reviewed to illustrate the folly of allowing CZMA consistency chal-
lenges to Federal activities.
In 1980, the United States was faced with handling over 131,000
Haitian and Cuban refugees. 136 President Carter declared an emergency
pursuant to the Disaster Relief Act, issuing an Executive Order exempting
compliance from several environmental protection acts and declaring the
action to be "necessary 'in the paramount interest of the United States. ' '
') 37
As part of the emergency efforts to process the refugees, Fort Allen, Puerto
Rico, was selected to become one of the refugee camps.138 The base was
a fighter airfield during World War II and was in the process of being
turned over to the Puerto Rico National Guard as a training center when it
was selected for the refugee operation.'3 9
Environmental concerns over sewage and solid waste disposal were
central to the siting selection challenge,"4 but the court also found that the
CZMA consistency requirements were violated.' First, a letter that simply
asserted the operations were consistent with Puerto Rico's Coastal Zone
Management Plan was deemed inadequate by the court because the letter
did not fully detail the activity, facilities, effects, and supporting data."
Next, the court decided that even if the letter was adequate notice to the
Commonwealth, the Federal government could not commence its opera-
tions until after a 90-day period lapsed, to allow the Commonwealth
adequate time to evaluate the consistency determination. 43 The govern-
ment made a defense claim that the Fort Allen operations were exempt
from the CZMA requirements because the CZMA excluded federal lands
from the definition of the "coastal zone."' 44 In a precursor to the Supreme
134. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 692 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
135. See State of New York v. United States General Services Administration, 823 F.
Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
136. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1041.
137. Id. at 1039.
138. See id at 1043, 1047.
139. Seeki
140. See id. at 1044.
141. See id at 1061.
142. See id at 1059.
143. See id
144. See id at 1059-60.
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Court decision in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.145
"Granite Rock" in 1987, the court rejected the defense, stating that the
"spillover effects" of the federal activities on the federal lands triggered the
CZMA consistency provisions'46 The court then issued an injunction
barring the refugee operations."' Thus, in the middle of emergency
international refugee relief operations declared to be in the "paramount
interest," opponents were able to use the procedural requirements of the
CZMA to judicially halt the operations.
The subsequent decision in Granite Rock was seen as a major victory
for state regulatory power over federal activities. 4 ' The California Coastal
Commission had demanded that Granite Rock Company apply for a state
permit to conduct mining operations on federal lands within the coastal
zone. 49 The company claimed that the state had no authority to require the
permit because of CZMA preemption and the exclusion of federal lands
from the coastal zone by the CZMA. 5° The Court held that "the CZMA
does not automatically pre-empt all state regulation of activities on federal
lands," and that absent express conflict with federal laws, the state's
environmental permit requirements were not preempted.' The Court
declared its holding to be a "narrow" one, distinguishing "reasonable" state
environmental regulations from land use regulations that would otherwise
be preempted by the Property Clause of the Constitution. 52 The majority
opinion was authored by Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, with Justices Powell, Stevens, Scalia, and White
dissenting,'53 in unusual combinations of liberal and conservative political
ideologies. "
Justice Powell stated the decision was an "abdication of federal control
over the use of federal land [that] is unprecedented."' 55 He noted that the
federal permit system required the federal agency to balance important
145. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
146. See Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. at 1060.
147. See id. at 1064.
148. See John D. Leshy, Granite Rock and the States'Influence Over Federal Land Use,
18 ENVTL L. 99, 100 (1987).
149. See California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 576.
Interestingly, California did not make a CZMA consistency objection to the federal mining
permit and was held to have waived its right to do so. See id. at 591.
150. See id. at 582, 589.
151. Id. at 592-93.
152. See id. at 593-94.
153. See id. at 574.
154. See Leshy, supra note 148, at 100.
155. California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 604 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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federal interests and astutely recognized that allowing the state agency to
"strike a different balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system."' 56
Justice Scalia bluntly called the exercise of state power "land use
control.'1 7 He agreed with the majority that the CZMA did not change any
state authority over federal lands, but asserted that the baseline was
exclusive federal authority. 158 In his view, the CZMA required:
[F]ederal officials to coordinate and consult with the States
regarding use of federal lands in order to assure consistency with
state land use plans to the maximum extent compatible with federal
law and objectives. Those requirements would be superfluous, and
the limitation upon federal accommodation meaningless, if the
States were meant to have independent land use authority over
federal lands.1
59
The "narrow distinction" between environmental and land use
regulation made by Justice O'Connor for the majority has been noted as
"slippery," creating "a substantial opportunity to state and local govern-
ments, especially those who are willing to review and, if necessary,
recharacterize their regulatory processes to shade them toward environmen-
tal regulation. ' ' "W This "negative power" of the states to obstruct federal
activities was expanded by Granite Rock and hailed as a boon to "coopera-
tive federalism."''
The reach of Granite Rock was promptly expanded beyond federal
permitted activities to actual federal agency activities in Friends of the
Earth v. United States Navy. 62 The Navy had been authorized, and funds
appropriated, by Congress to construct a new homeport facility for an
aircraft carrier battle group at Everett, Washington. 63 The project also
required dredging in Everett Harbor and disposal of the dredge spoil
material.' The dredging operations required both a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers and certification by the state under the terms of the
Clean Water Act.'6 The Navy complied and received the permit and
156. Id. at 605.
157. Id at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. See id at 613.
159. Ia at 612-13 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(3)(A), 1604(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)).
160. Leshy, supra note 148, at 103.
161. See id at 104-105, 129.
162. 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988).
163. See id at 929.
164. See id
165. See id at 929-30.
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certification. 166 However, the state also demanded that the Navy comply
with Washington's Shoreline Management Act (SMA) and obtain a permit
from the City of Everett. 67 The SMA was very similar to Florida's
networked program stressing local government standards and decision
making. 16' The Navy reluctantly applied for the city permit on March 2,
1987, and it was approved by the city on June 10, 1987.169 The State
reviewed the permit and approved it on July 8, 1987.70 Opponents of the
project then filed a state administrative agency appeal for review under the
SMA and while the administrative action was ongoing, the Navy issued
construction contracts for preliminary project work.' 7' The opponents then
sought an injunction in federal district court to halt all activity, but the
court denied their request.1 72 Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and granted the injunction. 73
The Navy argued that the SMA was primarily a land use regulation in
the state's Coastal Zone Management Program, adopted under the auspices
of the CZMA, and not applicable to the Navy activity.'74 The court, citing
to the then recent Granite Rock decision, disagreed, calling the SMA "a
mixed statute containing both land use and environmental regulations.' ' 75
The court failed to distinguish between the federal activities in this case
and the federally permitted activities at issue in Granite Rock, instead
deciding that the SMA regulations were sufficiently "environmental" to
require Navy compliance "regardless of whether that activity occurs on
federal or non-federal lands.' 76 Thus, even though the state did not
challenge the Navy activity through the CZMA consistency provisions,
those provisions opened the door for special interest group challenges at the
local government level through the SMA, and the resulting quagmire of
state and local law and administrative proceedings.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 930.
168. See id. at 935.
169. See id. at 930.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 930-31.
173. See id. at 937.
174. See id. at 935-36.
175. Id. at 936.
176. Id.
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B. Federal Permit Activities
Applicants for federal licenses or permits have stricter consistency
compliance requirements; they must certify in the application "that the
proposed activity complies with and will be conducted in a manner
consistent with the State's approved management program." '  A broad
definition is applied to the terms "license or permit" to mean "any required
authorization, certification, approval, or other form of permission." '78 All
OCS activities that affect the coastal zone must also meet the license and
permit consistency requirements.179 The state has six months to express an
objection to the consistency certification, in which case the federal agency
is forbidden to issue the permit or license."8
Appeals of consistency objections for permits and licenses may be
made to the Secretary of Commerce.' The Secretary may override the
objection only if he finds the activity either consistent with the objectives
of the CZMA or necessary for national security.' To be found consistent
with the objectives of the CZMA, each of the following requirements must
be met:
(a) The activity furthers the national interest as articulated in §
302 or § 303 of the Act, in a significant or substantial manner
(b) The national interest furthered by the activity outweighs the
activity's adverse coastal effects, when those effects are considered
separately or cumulatively.
(c) There is no reasonable alternative available which would
permit the activity to be conducted in a manner consistent with the
enforceable policies of the management program. When determin-
ing whether a reasonable alternative is available, the Secretary may
consider but is not limited to considering, previous appeal deci-
sions, alternatives described in objection letters and alternatives
and other new information described during the appeal.'83
The application of this process was illustrated in the consistency appeal
of Jessie Taylor in 1997.111 Mr. Taylor had purchased 0.62 acres of
177. 15 C.F.R. § 930.57(a) (2000).
178. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.51(a) (2001).
179. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.76 (2000).
180. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.63--64 (2001).
181. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.125 (2000).
182. See id. § 930.130.
183. l 15 C.F.R. § 930.121 (2001).
184. See In the Consistency Appeal of Jessie W. Taylor, available in 1997 NOAA
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commercial property in a developed commercial area, planning to build a
storage facility." 5 Adjacent lots had been filled to an elevation above his
and his property developed "wetland characteristics.' 86 Mr. Taylor applied
for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to fill his property and
offered to mitigate the wetlands loss by purchasing mitigation credits from
a wetlands mitigation bank equivalent to 2.85 acres of high quality
wetlands. 8 7 He certified the activity as consistent with South Carolina's
CZMEP, however the state did not agree and objected. Mr. Taylor appealed
to the Secretary for override. 8
The Secretary evaluated the appeal in accordance with the criteria of
the federal regulations, finding that: (1) the activity would foster develop-
ment, recognized by the CZMA as one of the competing uses; 8 9 (2) the
minimal adverse effects of the activity were more than offset by the
mitigation measure to create a net beneficial effect;" (3) there was no
violation of the Clean Water or Clean Air Act;' 9 ' and (4) the state proposed
no alternative measures or reasonable alternatives to the activity to achieve
consistency. 92 The Secretary concluded that the proposed activity was
consistent with the objectives of the CZMA and authorized the permit
issuance.'93
The question that comes to mind is why did this small business project
require the attention of the Secretary of Commerce? Unstated in the
appeal is any reason why the local government or the state of South
Carolina could not resolve the dispute with traditional land use, zoning, and
planning processes. The CZMA does not diminish a state's authority to use
its police powers" and the terms of the CZMA require "an enforceable
state policy" to apply the consistency requirement. " So, apparently the
CZMA really adds nothing to the already existing powers of the state when
it comes to permits and licenses for private applicants. Certainly, under
Florida's extensive growth management laws, sufficient statutory authority
exists for denial of land use projects that are not consistent with the local,
LEXIS 19 (Dep't Commerce, Dec. 30, 1997).
185. See id. at *9.
186. See id. at *10.
187. See id. at *30-31.
188. See id. at* 13-14.
189. See id. at *25.
190. See id. at *36.
191. See id. at *37.
192. See id. at *39.
193. See id. at *40.
194. See Rychlak, supra note 95, at 993.
195. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1994).
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regional, and state comprehensive plans. Attacking a small project like Mr.
Taylor's with a CZMA consistency objection appears to be a gross waste
of federal agency time and resources, and patently unfair to the applicant.
Not all small projects fare as well with appeals of consistency
objections. Indeed, the balancing test of a proposed project's contribution
to the national interest against potential adverse environmental impacts is
a difficult hurdle to overcome when the project is only for private use. This
systemic bias in favor of large commercial development and against small,
private projects is another major flaw of the CZIVIA consistency require-
ments process. The following appeals illustrate the issue.
Roger Fuller owned a small, unimproved lot bordering on a manmade
lake in North Carolina."9 The lot, bounded by the lake, a residential road,
and a "residentially-improved lake-front lot," had been prone to erosion and
flooding, allegedly caused by improper control of the water level for flood
control operations. 97 Mr. Fuller proposed to restore his lot by filling the
eroded area of shoreline and creating a four-foot wide grass buffer area.' 98
His permit application to the Army Corps of Engineers was objected to by
the state on the basis that the project was inconsistent with the state's
Coastal Management Program (CMP), citing development restrictions on
wetlands.'19 Mr. Fuller appealed to the Secretary for an override and lost.'
The Secretary outlined the analysis required by the regulations and
declared the balancing element dispositive." The Secretary accepted the
state's position that the filling of approximately 0.2 acres would have an
adverse effect, terming the results as "the loss of significant coastal fish and
wildlife habitat." m He also accepted the state's contention that the lake's
water quality would be reduced by the project because Mr. Fuller was
unable to present any evidence that the grass buffer strip would retard
sediment flow into the lake better than the "emergent palustrine wetlands"
of the eroded shoreline. 3 In evaluating the proposed project for its
"contribution to the national interest," residential development was
discounted as a policy goal of the CZMA in that it is not "economic
development." The goal of restoring and protecting the property from
196. See In the Consistency Appeal of Robert W. Fuller, [hereinafter Fuller] available
in 1992 NOAA Lexis 49, at *5 (Dep't Commerce, Oct. 2, 1992).
197. See id. at *4, *18.
198. See id at *5-6.
199. See id. at 8-10.
200. See id at *13, *38.
201. See id. at *16-17. The balancing element is that of 15 C.F.R. § 930.121(b).
202. Fuller, available in 1992 NOAA LEXIS 49, at *27.
203. See id. at *32-33.
204. See id. at *34-35.
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further flood damage and erosion was seen as a valid CZMA objective, but
the project's method was found to only "contribute minimally to the
national objective . . ."20' The balancing conclusion was obvious, the
adverse outweighed the contribution, and the override appeal was denied.'
The bias against private use projects can be further illustrated with the
consistency appeal of Olga Velez Lugo.2°7 Ms. Lugo owned an improved
(residential) lot on Salinas Bay, Puerto Rico.2" She proposed filling a
portion of the property to correct flooding from runoff from adjoining
properties, restore an existing boat ramp, and build a small (50-foot) wood
pier.209 Puerto Rico objected to her application for a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers, contending that the project would "adversely impact
natural systems for private benefit and contribute to the degradation of...
designated critical coastal wildlife areas."'21 The Secretary denied Ms.
Lugo's override appeal, again citing to the balancing element as the key
analysis issue.21
The arguments against the project were two-fold; the potential adverse
effects of the project itself, and the cumulative effects of "the project in
combination with other past, present and reasonably foreseeable future
activities affecting the coastal zone." '212 The Secretary found that some
fringe mangroves would be adversely impacted by the project, but more
importantly, that there would be cumulative adverse effects.213 The
cumulative effects would result from the project's contribution "to the boat
congestion problem which already exists in the Bay" and the contention
that "even small fill and construction projects will jeopardize the existing
marine habitat."2 4 The other side of the balancing test, the contribution to
the national interest, was again stated as "minimal, at best" because the
project was for private benefit. 5 Thus, since Ms. Lugo's project to build
on the water came later than those of others who already had built in the
area, she solely bore the burden of the cumulative adverse effects, and
because it was a private use project instead of commercial development,
205. Id. at *37-38.
206. See id. at *38.
207. See In the Consistency Appeal of Olga Velez Lugo, available in 1994 NOAA
LEXIS 32 (Dep't Commerce, Sept. 9, 1994).
208. See id. at *5.
209. See id.
210. Id. at *6-7.
211. Seeid. at*11,*24.
212. Id. at *11-12.
213. See id. at *19-20.
214. Id. at *13,*19.
215. See id. at *23.
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she could not demonstrate a significant contribution to win a favorable
balancing decision.
In stark contrast to the bias against small, private projects are the
appeals of consistency objections made over offshore oil and gas projects.
Florida has been particularly active in opposition to all phases of offshore
leasing, exploration, and development beyond its territorial waters,216 even
though it has sold leases and made royalty agreements for large land tracts
within its coastal waters.217 Current opposition to the development of
twenty production wells more than twenty-five miles south of Pensacola218
has drawn national political attention.1 9 However, Florida is not always
successful in its opposition, as evidenced by the consistency objection
override for Mobile Exploration in 1995.'
In 1989, Mobile proposed to drill six exploratory wells in lease tracts
10-20 miles south of Pensacola, Florida." The Minerals Management
Service of the Department of the Interior (DOI) approved the plan and,
remarkably, Florida agreed with the consistency certification of the plan in
19 9 0.2'l In September 1991, Mobile submitted a supplemental plan to drill
one additional well first, located 13.5 miles offshore.2' This time Florida
submitted a consistency objection in April 1992.' Mobile promptly
appealed to the Secretary of Commerce for an override.2'
Florida's position on the threshold issue regarding the validity of its
objection was that the possibility of an oil spill would conflict with its
pollution control statutes and so its objection was based on "enforceable
state policies" as required by the CZMA.'2 Mobile argued that Florida's
"buffer policy" to oppose all marine drilling within 100 miles was not an
enforceable policy of the approved coastal management program.2 7 The
216. See, e.g., Christie & Johnson, supra note 116, at 287-88; Mobile Exploration &
Producing U.S. Inc., 1993 NOAA LEXIS 4, *24 (Dep't Commerce, Jan. 7, 1993).
217. See Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles, 701 So. 2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
218. See Bill Kaczor, Foes: Drilling Puts State At Risk, TALL. DEM., Sept. 28, 1999, at
A6.
219. See, e.g., John Harwood, Gore Takes Aim at Offshore Oil Drilling As Bradley
Unveils an Antipoverty Plan, WALLST. J., Oct. 22,1999, at A20; Douglas Kiker, Gore Says
He Would Ban Offshore Oil Drilling, TAU. DEM., Oct. 22, 1999, at B1.
220. Seegenerally, Mobile Exploration& Producing U.S. Inc., available in 1995 NOAA
LEXIS 37 (Dep't Commerce, June 20, 1995).
221. See id. at *8-9.
222. See id. at *9.
223. See id, at *10.
224. See id. at *11.
225. See id, at *12.
226. See id, at *19.
227. See Id. at *20.
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Secretary opted to not consider the buffer policy issue, accepting as
sufficient the objection based upon pollution control regulations.2'
Mobile pleaded both override grounds in its appeal, consistency with
the objectives of the CZMA, and necessary in the interest of national
security.229 The national security argument was not persuasive and denied
with only cursory review and comments.230 The Secretary devoted the vast
majority of his decision to the balancing-of-interests element (Element
Two) for the first ground of the appeal. He noted, but rejected, Florida's
contention that Element One (the activity must further a national objective
of the CZMA) required the activity to be protective of the environment
also.2" The plain text of the CZMA recognizes energy self-sufficiency as
a national objective and the national interest was defined "to include both
protection and development of coastal resources. ' ' 2 The balancing occurs
in the consideration of Element Two.23
The discussion of adverse effects for this element included four
substantive sections: (1) Impacts from routine operations; (2) Cumulative
Effects; (3) Effects from mishaps such as oil spills; and (4) Impacts to
coastal uses.2" The evaluation and conclusion stated:
I find that the exploration will have minimal adverse effects on the
resources and uses of Florida's coastal zone, when conducted by
itself or when its cumulative effects are considered. Further, I find
that it is unlikely adverse impacts on the resources and uses of
Florida's coastal zone will result from an oil spill occurring from
Mobil's exploratory activities.235
The Secretary then evaluated the contribution to the national interest
and found that the potential discovery and development of 900 billion cubic
feet of natural gas furthered the national interest of energy self-sufficiency,
although he declined to term it a "significant" contribution.236 On balance,
he found that the general contribution outweighed the minimal and unlikely
adverse impacts, while also noting Florida's previous agreement to the
228. See id.
229. See id. at *28.
230. See id. at *94-98.
231. See id. at *30-31.
232. Id.
233. See id. at *32.
234. See id. at *40.
235. Id. at *79.
236. See id. at *83-84.
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exploration plans for the other six drilling wells."7 The Secretary also
found no evidence of violation of the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act
requirements of Element Three, 8 and rejected Florida's proposed
alternative (to delay the project indefinitely) as unreasonable for Element
Four. 9 The ultimate conclusion was that Mobil's plan was consistent with
the objectives and purposes of the CZMA, and so Florida's objection was
overridden' u Thus, a single exploratory oil and gas well in coastal waters,
with the potential for massive future development, was able to succeed in
the consistency appeals process, whereas small, private erosion control or
boat pier construction projects could not.
IV. THE FLAWS OF CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CZMA
As we have seen, a state can enforce its own environmental and land
use policies within the state without using the CZMA. The Supreme Court
has even gone so far as to approve of state permit requirements for
activities on federal lands within the coastal zone,"4 even though those
lands are excluded by the definitions of the CZMA.242 The CZMA
encourages redundancy in local, state, and federal agencies to develop
regulations, evaluate applications, and "coordinate" actions. 3  The
divided, excessive authority is costly, inconvenient, and erodes public
confidence in government.' The consistency review and appeal process
is unfair to individuals wishing to pursue small or private projects because
of the inherent system bias for commercial development and environmental
protection.
One commentator called the consistency doctrine a success because a
study showed a 99% concurrence rate in a one year period (1983) and 97%
in another (1987).' A NOAA Consistency study of the 1983 federal fiscal
year reported 984 state objections to 7,762 federal decisions, with the vast
majority of the objections to license and permit applications.' 6 Even the
State of Florida notes that of its approximately 4,000 reviews each year, it
237. See id. at *86.
238. See id. at *86-91.
239. See iL at *91-93.
240. See id. at *98.
241. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
242. See 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1995).
243. See Rychlak, supra note 95, at 998.
244. See kL at 995-996.
245. See Godschalk, supra note 9, at 109.
246. See Whitney et al., supra note 4, at 83.
2001]
106 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:77
agrees with 99% of the consistency determinations.247 Should valuable
taxpayer resources of time, people, and money be wasted in these types of
routine, redundant reviews?
Would anything be lost, or the environment harmed, if the CZvIA
consistency requirements were repealed? No; other laws provide more
specific and detailed standards that are still applied, such as the Clean
Water Act248 and the Clean Air Act,249 that are mandated by the CZMA.
Other applicable statutes include the Endangered Species Act, 250 Marine
Mammal Protection Act,25" ' Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries
Act,252 National Environmental Policy Act,253 and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act 54 Many of these already contain mandatory "consultation
and coordination" provisions that could apply to reviews of coastal zone
activities and permit applications without giving states and local govern-
ments near veto authority over federal agency decisions. Additionally, the
Administrative Procedure Act can be used to challenge agency decisions
through a formal hearing process and avenues for judicial review."
Even supporters of the CZMA have noted problems of inconsistent,
conflicting, and redundant requirements imposed by the multiple levels of
government involvement in the decision process.25 6 This comes at a cost
that taxpayers must ultimately pay.257 The "layered federalism" of the
CZMA creates inequities between the states and jeopardizes the achieve-
ment of national norms.258 Critics have claimed the burdens of the CZMA
to be unconstitutional, 25 9 and called for the development of a Federal Public
Trust Doctrine to "put the onus of balancing the interests in our nation's
247. See Florida Dep't. of Comm. Affairs, (visited Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.dca.
state.fl.us/ffcm/>.
248. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
250. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
251. Id. §§ 1361-1421(w).
252. Id. §§ 1431-1445b.
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
254. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994).
255. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
256. See Rychlak, supra note 95, at 995-996.
257. See id. at 996.
258. See Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models From Other Laws Save Our Public
Lands? 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & POL'Y 193, 207 (1996).
259. See Whitney et al., supra note 4, at 68. This article is noteworthy because the
contention of unconstitutionality was written while the "directly affecting" was still subject
to the strict construction of Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) and
before the expansive CZMA amendments of 1990.
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coastal waters where it belongs-with the federal government. ' 2" The
illustrated fundamental flaws of the CZMA federal consistency require-
ments support those criticisms.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Thirty-three of thirty-five eligible states and territories have approved
coastal management programs;26" ' the consistency "carrot" is no longer
required to stimulate the development of those programs. The CZMA was
due for reauthorization from Congress in 1999 but has been held up over
two controversial amendments pertaining to protection of private property
rights and nonpoint source pollution control programs.262 No changes to
the consistency provisions were included in the proposed reauthorization
bill,263 nor in the Clinton administration's reauthorization proposal.26' The
proposals provide for renewed grant funding, mandate an evaluation of the
effectiveness of CZMA programs, and emphasize support for coastal
communities.26
Congress should eliminate the federal consistency requirements from
the CZMA while the legislation is still pending and before any reauthoriza-
tion of new funding. A system of basic national standards should be
developed as a baseline for all coastal activities, with consultation and
coordination encouraged, but ultimate decision authority retained by the
appropriate federal agency tasked with the balancing of national interests
involved in the activity. States should be granted standing to pursue
administrative appeals of final agency actions under the APA to ensure
their valued input to the decision process. Specific, localized concerns
could be addressed by state initiated petitions for federal rules and
regulations development by federal agencies. The states would retain their
sovereign police powers to regulate land use within their borders, but those
260. Lattimer, supra note 46, at 164.
261. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The Coastal Management
Enhancement Act of 1999, (last modified Aug. 29, 2000) <http:llwww.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/
czna> [hereinafter 1999 CZMA Proposal].
262. See H.R. REP. No. 106-485 (1999).
263. H.R. 2669, 106th Cong. (1999).
264. See 1999 CZMA Proposal, supra note 261.
265. See id. The budget for the CZMA grants to the states is remarkably small. The
total amount authorized for FY99 was only $57 million (Florida's share was $2,795,000),
with modest increases proposed by the Clinton administration and H.R. 2669. Savings from
the repeal of consistency review requirements could be channeled into state grant increases
for enhanced coastal management and coastal property acquisitions for preservation and
public use. See id.
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powers should not continue to be extended to federal lands or waters. The
result would be a more efficient system of administration of coastal
management without the breach of basic separation of powers between the
states and the federal government.
The "management" in the Coastal Zone Management Act has been
nearly destroyed by the capitulation of federal authority imposed by the
federal consistency requirements. It is time for Congress to reassert the
federal authority, and insist that the coastal resources be managed instead
of being held captive to the environmental special interest groups. The
fundamentally flawed federal consistency provisions of the CZMA should
be abolished and replaced with a rational, efficient system of coastal
resources management that can realistically balance competing state and
local interests while maintaining the supremacy of national policy interests.
